This paper presents a two-country intra-industry trade model with bilateral ad valorem tariffs and fixed export costs that are heterogeneous across firms. In this model not all firms will choose to export. We examine the effects of reciprocal changes in the tariff and the fixed export barrier on the number of firms, firm profits, tariff revenue and consumer welfare. We show that both types of trade barriers reduce (increase) the number of exporting (pure domestic) firms. However, the sum of available home and foreign varieties increases for small tariffs. Firm profits are falling in both tariff and fixed export cost barriers. Tariff revenue falls when fixed export costs increase whereas we have a Laffer curve effect for the tariff. Welfare falls when fixed export costs increase and increases for small tariffs and falls for large tariffs, i.e. there exists a welfare maximizing tariff.
Introduction
Intra-industry trade theory has recently been revolutionized by the introduction of firm-level heterogeneity. See for example Schmitt and Yu (2001) , Montagna (2001) , Melitz (2003) or Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) that all present models where firms are heterogeneous with respect to their cost structures. Such extensions of the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model provide new insights that reconcile the theory of international trade with the stylized facts of international trade. However, thus far the literature has not examined the implications of these new types of assumptions for the effects of trade policies such as tariffs. The key contribution of this paper is to incorporate tariffs into an intra-industry trade framework with firm-level heterogeneous fixed costs of exporting, and to examine the effects of bilateral tariff barriers and the fixed export cost barriers on the number and type of firms, on firm profits, on tariff revenues and on consumer welfare. We address this issue using the Schmitt and Yu (2001) specification of a Krugman (1980) -type intra-industry trade model. We extend the model with a bilateral ad valorem tariff and allow the range of the fixed export cost barriers to vary. Furthermore, in the model we assume that tariff revenues and firm profits are redistributed in a lump sum fashion to consumers.
We establish the following results. The number of exporting firms is falling, while the total number of home firms and the number of pure domestic firms is increasing, in both the tariff and the fixed export costs trade barrier. However, the number of available varieties (i.e. home varieties plus foreign exported varieties) is falling in fixed export costs, while it is increasing in small tariffs, yet falling in large tariffs. Total firm profits decrease in both the fixed export cost barriers and the tariff barrier. Total tariff revenue displays Laffer curve properties in the tariff level, yet it is falling in fixed export costs. Finally, any increase in the fixed export cost barriers reduces consumer welfare, but small tariffs may increase welfare compared to the zero tariff (free trade) situation. Yet, welfare under the trade-prohibiting tariff is clearly below free trade welfare. Thus, there exists a positive welfare maximizing bilateral tariff. The latter result contradicts part of the existing literature, including previous findings made in intra-industry trade models where firms are homogeneous in their cost structure, e.g. Gros (1987) , Jørgensen and Schröder (2005a) . Furthermore, Melitz (2003) and Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2004) both using frameworks with firm-level heterogeneous marginal costs, examine, inter alia, iceberg trade cost reductions, which are often interpreted to represent trade liberalization, and find a monotone negative relation between trade costs and welfare.
For the purpose of this paper it is useful to distinguish broad groups of trade costs. On the one hand we have real trade barriers, i.e. trade costs that are real in terms of actually absorbing resources, for example transport costs, customs formalities or costs of circumventing language barriers, etc. Such trade costs burn up resources, e.g. firms have to hire people to deal with border formalities and administrative red tape, or accrue additional costs from implementing foreign regulations or safety requirements. On the other hand, tariff trade barriers result in costs at the firm level, but -except for deadweight losses -not necessarily for the economy, since tariff revenues will eventually be redistributed. Furthermore, trade costs can be of a perunit type (occurring for every unit shipped abroad) or of an ad valorem type (a percentage of the value shipped abroad), examples of the latter -apart from tariffs -are insurance costs or currency risks. Alternatively, trade costs may be fixed in nature, say building a distribution network or adjusting a product to local safety standards, and accrue independent of the volume or value of exports. A typical approach to modelling trade costs in formal work is iceberg trade costs, aimed at capturing per unit real trade costs. Though convenient from a modelling perspective, other types of trade costs may be empirically more relevant. For example, Hummels and Skiba (2004) , show that the modelling device of iceberg trade costs cannot be supported empirically. The trade costs, that the present paper models, are ad valorem tariff costs (i.e. the typical design of real world tariffs) and fixed export costs modelled as a real trade barrier; i.e. accruing regardless of the actual amount traded and of the price charged by the exporting firm. Furthermore, we assume fixed export costs to vary with the type of variety that is exported, i.e. they are firm-level heterogenous. Thus some varieties may be easier to export than others. 1 It is this latter aspect that is of particular interest in the present paper, since it addresses the exporting decision of firms and offers the possibility of capturing the obvious real world fact that some good are exported and others are not.
The next section presents the model. In Section 3, we derive the formal results concerning the impact of tariffs and fixed export costs on the number and type of firms, firm profits, tariff revenue, and consumer welfare. Section 4 discusses the results and policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Consumers in two identical countries, home and foreign, love variety and have identical preferences, in which all consumption goods, c, enter symmetrically. Utility is given by The number of variants actually produced (n d , n t , and n f ) is assumed to be large, although smaller than N d , N t and N f . Furthermore, denoting foreign variables by * , the symmetry of the setup implies n t = n * f = n f = n * t and that trade is balanced. Firms can produce their specific variant for the home market alone or for both the home and foreign market. Each firm produces with the same constant marginal cost β and a fixed cost α, both expressed in terms of labor, L, which is the only factor of production and is remunerated at the economywide wage rate w. When exporting, a firm faces an additional firm-specific fixed export cost, a i , heterogeneous across firms and assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, γ], γ ≥ α, with F (.) denoting the distribution function. Thus γ is a measure of the size of the fixed export cost barriers to trade.
3 Furthermore, both countries charge the same ad valorem tariff τ ∈ [0, 1] on imports, i.e. a bilateral tariff. The profit functions of a pure domestic firm only servicing the home market, and an exporting home firm servicing both markets, are
where x d is the production of a pure domestic firm, and x t and x z are the output of an exporting firm to the home and the foreign market respectively. Finally, various market-clearing relations complete the model: labor market clearing,
where R denotes the lump-sum redistributed profits and tariff revenues; goods market clearing
, where the foreign index i f and the home index i t denote one and the same variant; and similar relations for the foreign country.
Maximization of (1) leads to the familiar inverse demand functions, i.e.
for any non-traded home good i d , and similar for traded products, given that the number of products is large. Then, profit maximization of (2) results in the price
Given free entry and exit, there are zero profits for non-trading firms in equilibrium and accordingly, the per-firm output volume is:
Maximizing (3) with respect to x t and x z , the price decisions are
for sales on the home and the foreign market respectively. 4 Since p t = p d consumers do not distinguish between non-traded home products and traded home products; and hence, sales of trading firms on their home are:
Sales of home firms on the foreign market -and import sales by foreign firms on the home market -are different. Note that p z =
exported/imported goods are more expensive than domestically produced goods. In equilibrium, maximization of utility (1) requires that the ratio of the marginal utility of an extra consumption unit equals the price ratio, i.e.
4 Here, we follow Schmitt and Yu (2001) , where trading firms reach breakeven on their home market operation. Different entry decision mechanisms are conceivable, e.g. as in Melitz (2003) where firms determine their entry based on expected total profits and subject to some sunk investment, see e.g. Jørgensen and Schröder (2005b) .
Thus an export firm sells less of its variety abroad than at home.
Given the above prices and quantities the firm, just indifferent between starting to export and being a pure domestic firm, can be identified by a fixed cost of exportā so that it makes zero profits from the export activity. Solving from (3) 
All firms i so that a i ∈ [0,ā] make positive or non-negative profits from exporting, while all firms i so that a i ∈]ā, γ] are non-trading firms. Furthermore,ā decreases in the tariff rate, implying that the least efficient (high a i ) firms will cease their trading activity in response to a tariff increase. The total number of firms at home, n = n t + n d , can be determined via the labor market clearing condition. Utilizing the fact that the average fixed cost of export is given byā/2, and that n t = F (ā)n and n d = (1 − F (ā))n must hold, we get:
Results
From the above model we are able to derive results on the number and type of firms, firm profit, tariff revenue and consumer welfare. In particular, we are interested in how these measures react to changes in both the tariff trade barrier, τ , and the size of the fixed export cost barrier, γ.
From (11), (12) and (13) Furthermore, because of trade, consumers also have access to foreign varieties, in particular due to symmetry n t = n * t = n f , and thus the number of varieties available on either of the markets isñ = n + n f . From (13) and (12) the number of varieties available on the home market is:
It is easy to verify that ∂ñ ∂γ < 0, i.e. fixed export cost barriers reduce the number of available varieties. To see the implications of the tariff consider Figure 1 . We plot the number of firms given in (11) to (13) and the number of varieties available on the home market given in (14) for L = 100, α = 0.5, γ = 0.9 and θ = 0.7. What the figure reveals is that with the imposition of a small bilateral tariff, the exit of trading firms and therewith the loss of n t and n f is more than compensated by the entry of additional pure domestic firms n d , thus increasing the total number of varieties available,ñ. We can state the following result:
Result 2. (Number of available varieties) The total number of available varieties is falling in the fixed exporting costs. The number of available varieties increases for a small tariff, but the number of varieties under free trade (zero tariff ) is larger than under the prohibitive autarky tariff.
For proof, see appendix. Next we consider the implications of trade barriers for firm profits. Since firms make zero profit at the home market we only have to examine export profits in order to get total profits. The average fixed export costs of those firms that do export areā/2 and hence, total industry profits
From (15) 
Result 3. (Firm profits) Total firm profits are falling in both tariffs and fixed export costs.
Thus from an industry perspective Result 3 states -not surprisinglythat bilateral reductions of trade barriers (both tariffs and fixed export costs) are desirable.
5 Note however, that if one looks at per firm profit instead, i.e. profit of the average export firm, then firm profit is still falling in tariffs but independent of the fixed export costs. The latter effect stems from the fact, that the cut-off fixed cost of export of the firm just indifferent between starting to export and being a pure domestic firm,ā, is independent of γ. Thus an increase in the fixed export costs only reduces the number of exporting firm -and thus total profits -but not the profits of the average export firm. From a government perspective tariff revenue is important. Total tariff revenue in the above setting is given by R = n t τ p z x z , which becomes:
From (16) we immediately have that

∂R ∂γ
< 0, thus an increase in fixed export cost barriers reduces tariff revenue. The relation between tariff revenue and the tariff level, however, is less straightforward and we provide numerical simulations instead. In Figure 2 we have set α = 0.5, β = 0.8, θ = 0.3, w = 1 and L = 100. We show the resulting tariff revenue for three different levels of fixed exporting costs; namely for γ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5. The figure displays the typical Laffer curve properties. The following results concerning tariff revenue can be stated: Finally, we can consider the impact of both types of trade barriers on consumers. In the above model all tariff revenues and firm profits are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to consumers. Thus total consumer utility is a measure of welfare. Given goods market clearing and (1), we can write
Result 4. (Tariff revenue) Total tariff revenue is falling when fixed export
, and setting in values from above and simplifying gives:
Since (17) is in fact the value of total consumer utility under autarky, we have a simple measure of the welfare gain from trade, namely For proof, see appendix. To illustrate Result 6, consider figure 3 which plots b as a function of τ for various values of θ (for the plot we set α = 0.5 and γ = 0.9). To the right (for τ close to 1) we are in the autarky situation, and accordingly there are no gains from trade (b = 1). For τ = 0, we are in the free trade situation, and welfare in both countries is clearly above the autarky level (b > 1). What Result 6 implies is in fact that there is too much trade in the free trade situation; in particular, the bilateral reduction of tariffs smaller thanτ , will be welfare-reducing. The driver for Result 6 is the number of available varieties,ñ. From Result 2 we know that even thoughñ under free trade is larger than under autarky, the imposition of a small bilateral tariff, which causes the exit of trading firms and therewith the loss of n t and n f , is more than compensated by the entry of additional pure domestic firms n d , thus increasingñ, and this increase does -due to love of variety -increase utility, i.e. total consumer welfare. The flip-side of this effect is of course, that trading firms, since entry/exit decisions are based on home market performance alone, actually make profits.
Finally, consider the relation between tariffs and the level of fixed exporting costs. In particular, from Results (6) and (5) we know that there exists a positive bilateral tariffτ that maximizes total welfare of both countries and that national welfare decreases in fixed export costs. The following result, on how the welfare maximizing bilateral tariff depends on the fixed export costs, emerges.
Result 7. (Interaction ofτ and γ)The welfare maximizing bilateral tariff,τ , falls when the level of fixed export costs, γ, increases; i.e.
∂τ ∂γ < 0.
For proof of ∂τ ∂γ
< 0, see appendix. A decrease in fixed export costs does increase the overall level of national welfare but it also increases the welfare maximizing bilateral tariff.
Discussion
One of the findings that deserves further comment concerns the number of firms and available varieties (Results 1 and 2) . While the total number of home firms, the number of pure domestic and the number of export active firms react as expected to the trade barrier, the number of available varieties does react differently. In particular, the number of available varieties increases for small tariffs. For we saw that with the imposition of a small bilateral tariff, the exit of trading firms and therewith the loss of n t and n f is more than compensated by the entry of additional pure domestic firms n d , thus increasing the total number of varieties available,ñ. This is what in turn promotes the increase in welfare established in Result 6. In principle this effect occurs because in the free trade situation firms make profits that do not lead to additional entry. In particular, since firms base their entry/exit decision on the home market alone so that home sales will result in zero profit, it is only the export activity that actually harvest positive profits (which in turn are redistributed within the model). Once a small tariff is imposed the system is brought closer to the welfare maximizing situation.
The intuition for this ability of small tariffs to generate additional variety is as follows: Any bilateral tariff reduces the number of imported varieties and the import volume of all remaining varieties. A small tariff forces fairly inefficient (high a i ) exporters out. Paired with the resources saved by reducing the trading activity of all remaining exporting firms, this frees enough resources for the production of more home varieties. Notice also that there exists a volume-variety trade-off here, where the tariff reduces the volume of each remaining importer/exporter but converts it into additional domestic entry. However, beyondτ , a further tariff increase further cuts imported volumes, and more importantly, it forces fairly efficient (low a i ) exporters out. Thus, additional variants produced relatively cheaply (i.e. by foreign exporters who have fairly low fixed export costs) are replaced with variants produced relatively expensively (i.e. by new home producers incurring the fixed production cost, α).
Next consider the political economy implications of the above results. We have established that total firm profits are falling in both tariffs and fixed export costs (Result 3). Thus from an industry perspective this finding implies that industry interests favor reciprocal reductions of trade barriers. Yet, from a government perspective tariff revenues might matter and here the picture is different. An increase in fixed export barriers always reduces tariff revenue, but the relation between tariff revenue and the tariff level displays Laffer curve properties (Result 4). Finally, from a consumer perspective, reductions in fixed export barriers would be beneficial, but complete free trade would not be in their interest (Results 5 and 6). Accordingly, if one supposes that countries stance on trade liberalization is a composite of industry, government and consumer interests, then these results imply that a consensus is easier obtained on policies targeting reductions in fixed export cost barriers than on policies aiming at free trade with zero tariffs. Notice also, however, that while both tariff revenue and welfare considerations lead towards some positive tariff, this is most likely not the same tariff level.
In this respect it is also important to notice that from Result 7 we know that the consumer welfare maximizing bilateral tariff falls when the level of fixed export costs increases. Thus a decrease in the fixed export cost barriers does not only increase the overall level of national welfare but it also increases the welfare maximizing bilateral tariff. Hence, in this sense the fixed export costs and the tariff are substitutes. Thus policies or technological changes, that lower fixed export cost barriers, would within this model result in an increase of the optimal tariff. The reason is, of course, that with lower fixed export cost barriers many more firms are export active, and accordingly the marginal resource saving from increasing a small tariff (and converting these resources into additional domestic variety) increases. Remember, the underlying mechanism for this result was that tariff always forces the least efficient exporters to exit and reduce the trade volume of all other exporters. Put differently, assuming a situation with initial zero tariffs and fixed export cost barriers so large that they prohibited all but one firm from engaging in exports, then any small tariff would force that one firm to exit and clearly reduce welfare, accordingly the optimal tariff for near prohibitive fixed export cost barriers must be zero.
Conclusion
In an intra-industry trade model with firm-level heterogeneous fixed export costs, we examine the impact of reciprocal changes in the level of fixed export costs and a bilateral tariff on the number and type of firms, on firm profits, on tariff revenue and on consumer welfare.
The paper establishes a number of results. For example, while the number of trading firms is falling and the number of pure domestic firms is increasing in either type of trade barrier, the total number of available varieties (i.e. home varieties plus foreign exported varieties) is increasing in small tariffs but is falling in a large tariffs and in fixed export costs. Furthermore firm profits decrease in both the fixed export barrier and the tariff, while total tariff revenue displays Laffer curve properties in the tariff level, yet falls in the fixed export costs barrier. Finally, any increase in fixed export costs reduces welfare but a small tariff may increase welfare compared to the zero tariff (free trade) situation. In particular, there exists a positive bilateral ad valorem tariff that maximizes national and world welfare.
These findings suggest that the mechanisms of trade policies in intraindustry trade models are affected by the introduction of firm-level heterogeneity. Future research should investigate further types of trade barriers/policies, other sources of firm heterogeneity such as marginal cost heterogeneity, and different types of firm entry mechanisms. 
A.2 Proof of Result 6.
By inspection of (18) we have that free trade welfare exceeds autarky welfare, i.e. that b| τ =0 > b| τ =1 = 1.
Proof. A small bilateral tariff increases welfare.
Differentiating the welfare gain, b, from (18) with respect to τ gives:
(A.5)
Evaluating at τ = 0 gives: .6) 
